In the last decade, voluntary efforts by firms to reduce their environmental impacts have received increasing attention from both policymakers and scholars. In this article, we consider polluters' incentives to reduce their releases. In particular, using data from Canada's National Pollutant Release Inventory, we examine the impacts of conventional regulation, threats of regulation, and non-governmental pressures facilitated by public dissemination of information about pollutant releases. We find that the vast majority of reductions reported to the inventory to date were not voluntary, as has often been assumed, but are, rather, the result of direct regulation of a relatively small number of polluters. We find strong effects of federal regulation among other sources as well, with much weaker responses to the mere threat of regulation. However, we raise concerns about growth of less visible waste streams, such as land disposal and underground injection, as well as transfers of wastes to other communities. Finally, we report evidence that some waste streams are increasing in toxicity, an effect that may outweigh the benefits of reductions in releases.
Introduction
In the last decade, voluntary efforts by industry to reduce pollution have received increasing attention from policymakers and scholars alike. One can identify several factors that might prompt a firm to voluntarily reduce its releases. The firm might seek to realize cost savings by reducing losses of valuable energy and chemicals. Alternatively, even if pollution control is costly, the firm might respond to market pressure from environmentally-conscious consumers. Workers concerned about their own health or the health of their local community may demand wage increases, again prompting the firm to reduce its releases voluntarily. Pressure may also emanate from investors, whether because of their own environmental values or their anticipation of green pressures from consumers, workers, or fellow shareholders. Local or national environmental groups may exert influence to the extent that they can alert sympathetic workers, consumers, and investors to a firm's environmental record. Finally, a firm may choose to reduce its releases voluntarily in an effort to forestall anticipated regulation.
Dissemination of more complete information about pollutant releases would be expected to strengthen each of these factors. As consumers, workers, investors, and even regulators become aware of risks posed by a facility, they may be more motivated to "take matters into their own hands." This is the raison d'etre for pollutant release and transfer registries, also known as community right-to-know inventories. The novel element of these inventories is that the information that the state requires individual facilities to report is in turn released to the public. In 1988, the US EPA established the first such inventory, known as the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), which requires that firms that meet certain criteria report information on their discharges and off-site transfers of several hundred toxic substances to EPA. Since then, the Canadian government created its National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI) in 1993, and similar inventories have also been established in Australia and the European Union.
Early experience with these inventories has prompted considerable enthusiasm. Total releases and transfers reported to the US TRI declined by 46% from 1988 to 1999, 37% in the first five years along (Graham and Miller (2001) ). As discussed below, on-site releases reported to the Canadian NPRI have also fallen dramatically, by 38% in the first three years. These unanticipated declines have lead various commentators to conclude that, in prompting voluntary action by industry, pol-lutant release inventories are at least as effective as more coercive discharge regulations. Thus, former US EPA Administrator Carol Browner has argued that TRI is "quite simply one of the most effective means we have in this country for protecting the health of our people, the health of the environment."
1 Similarly, Fung and O'Rourke (2000) have asserted that "it is arguable that TRI has dramatically outperformed all other EPA regulations over the last ten years in terms of overall toxics reductions and that it has done so at a fraction of the cost of those other programs."
In this article, we examine recent trends in toxic releases in Canada using NPRI data in an effort to better understand what motivates firms to reduce their releases. We consider the impact of actual and threatened regulations as well as non-governmental pressures facilitated by release of the discharge inventory. It is noteworthy that in absence of baseline data on pollutant emissions prior to publication of NPRI, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the impact of information dissemination per se. One simply has no basis to project what would have happened in the absence of publication of the inventory. We acknowledge this methodological limitation, but look instead for indirect evidence of the kinds of stakeholder pressures that one might expect to see enhanced by information dissemination.
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The discussion that follows suggests three main conclusions. First, we offer evidence that the significant reductions in toxic releases that have been observed in Canada since NPRI was introduced are largely the result of traditional command and control regulation, rather than voluntary action prompted by pressures from non-governmental actors newly armed with pollutant release information. Second and consistent with this, we present evidence that actual regulation has been more effective in motivating emissions reductions than the mere threat of regulation. Finally, we document evidence of disturbing waste transfers across media, between pollutants, and between communities. Although we are not in a position to state whether these trends are a perverse effect of regulation or a voluntary response to non-governmental pressures, we do argue that these troubling trends have received too little attention.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews different incentives for firms to make voluntary reductions. Thereafter, we present our methodology and preview aggregate trends in the data. Statistical analyses of NPRI panel data to examine the impacts of non-governmental and regulatory pressures are presented in the next section, which is followed by our conclusions.
Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Theory and Evidence
What factors would be expected to influence a facility's level of pollution and trends in pollution over time? Most obviously, each facility's environmental performance will be a function of internal factors, including the nature of its processes, the costs or benefits of pollution control, and the scale of production. In the analysis that follows, we attempt to account for the first two of these factors by controlling for facility type. With respect to the third, in the absence of production or sales data at the facility level we introduce number of employees as a surrogate for production scale.
In addition to these internal factors, a facility may face pressures from five external groups:
consumers, workers, shareholders, local and national community groups, and regulators. It is noteworthy that prior to publication of a pollutant release inventory, these actors typically would have had little or no knowledge of the kinds and quantity of pollutants released by a given facility.
Facilities thus might be expected to face increased pressure from external stakeholders after the publication of pollutant inventories. We thus examine separately releases in each year and trends in releases over time.
Consumer and Employee Pressures
The emergence of a "green consumerism" movement in the late 1980s held the promise of meaningful consumer pressure on firms to voluntarily reduce their environmental impact. Consistent with this, both Arora and Cason (1996) and Khanna and Damon (1999) found that firms that were consumer product-oriented were more likely to participate in EPA's 33/50 program, which encouraged voluntary reductions of some 17 TRI chemicals. Although Canadian data do not allow a comparable analysis using NPRI data, elsewhere (Antweiler and Harrison (2000) ) we have reported indirect evidence of weak consumer pressure in the form of a "spillover effect," by which consumers react to discharge information by punishing the entire firm, rather than particular products or facilities.
There has been less attention to influence of employees on firms' environmental behaviour.
The role of unions in accessing and interpreting workplace hazards information (Robinson (1988)) and in bargaining for compensation for workplace hazards (Leigh and Gill (1991) ), suggests that unionized workers may be better able to access and interpret information available in pollutant re-lease inventories, and to act collectively to demand reductions or compensation. However, we have previously examined the impact of rate of unionization on NPRI releases and found no evidence that unionized workers place greater environmental pressure on their employers (Antweiler and Harrison (2000)).
Investor Pressures
A series of recent articles has found evidence that investors have used environmental information in sophisticated ways to pressure firms to voluntarily reduce their releases. Hamilton (1995) demonstrated that firms that reported large TRI discharges were more likely to be mentioned in media reports, which in turn resulted in losses in the stock market. Konar and Cohen (1997) confirmed that firms that received more negative media attention to their TRI reports responded by making greater emission reductions than their peers. Finally, Khanna et al. (1998) found that investors have been persistent, penalizing firms whose TRI releases have declined over time and rewarding those that have made progress.
In interpreting these findings, a critical question is what is motivating shareholders. Investors may be motivated by physical self-interest (e.g., if they are living near a polluting facility), altruistic environmental concern, or pecuniary self-interest in anticipation of negative impacts of community, consumer, worker, or governmental pressures. The literature on investors' responses to discharge inventories does not distinguish between these motives. Yet, investors' motivations have significant implications for public policy. To the extent that shareholders are acting on their own or consumers' environmental concern, their actions can serve as at least a partial substitute for regulation. However, if shareholders are acting in anticipation of state coercion or civil litigation, the impact of discharge inventories on firms via investors is predicated on statutory mechanisms for pollution control. It is noteworthy that the finding by Laplante and Lanoie (1994) that firms'
announcements of investments in pollution control equipment decrease their equity value is consistent with only the regulatory motive. We leave comparison of the NPRI reports of publicly-traded and private firms in Canada for future work.
Community and Interest Group Pressures
Local and national environmental groups can also seek to promote voluntary pollution reductions.
Groups in both Canada and the US have enthusiastically embraced their respective national pollutant release inventories as a basis for their activities (Maclean (1996) , Lynn and Kartez (1994) ). Local community groups have negotiated neighborhood agreements with individual facilities, while their national counterparts have taken out advertisements in national newspapers to shame companies reporting the greatest toxic releases and have also developed sophisticated web sites to facilitate public interpretation of TRI and NPRI data.
3 Are polluters listening? It is worth noting that community group pressures differ from those from other stakeholders discussed above in that their leverage over a firm is indirect. Interest groups will exert influence over polluters only to the extent that polluters perceive that groups can influence actors who do have a direct relationship with the firm, whether through markets (consumers, investors, workers) or public law (regulators, civil litigants). This indirect effect thus would be manifested in exaggerated consumer, worker, investor, and regulatory pressure.
As with investors, the implications of community pressures for public policy depend on whether those pressures are exerted through markets or public law. It is noteworthy that Grant (1997) found that state right-to-sue policies were among the most significant influences on changes over time in aggregate state discharges. Maxwell, Lyon, and Decker (2000) found that reductions in TRI discharges were significantly greater in states with both high levels of releases and large number of environmental group members per capita. The authors speculate that firms with comparatively low abatement costs that faced a greater threat of regulation in response to public pressures were more inclined to reduce their discharges voluntarily.
In seeking evidence of community pressures, we note that activists may have greater influence on some actors and some facilities, thus providing indirect evidence of their influence. First, at both the national and local level, the tendency of interest groups has been to focus on the firms and facilities with the largest releases. In the empirical analysis that follows we thus test whether larger facilities will make a greater effort to reduce their releases over time. Second, we anticipate that community pressures will be a function of population density. When more people reside near a polluting facility, there are simply more angry neighbours to pressure the facility or to pressure regulators to do so. We thus anticipate both that facilities in more densely populated communities will have lower releases than comparable facilities in less densely populated communities to start with, and that they will make a greater effort to reduce their releases over time in the wake of dissemination of NPRI data.
Third, one can speculate that facilities will face different interest group pressures depending on the resources available to their host communities. Various scholars have reported that communities that experience greater exposure to toxic wastes tend to be less educated, home to a higher proportion of African Americans, and poorer, though many authors report a quadratic relationship with income, reflecting tensions between the local wealth generated by polluting facilities and the antipathy of wealthy communities to pollution (Brooks and Sethi (1997) , Ringquist (1997), Terry and Yandle (1997) (Tietenberg (1998) ). Consistent with the latter, Grant (1997) found smaller relative reductions of TRI discharges over time in states with higher fractions of non-white residents. Similarly, Brooks and Sethi (1997) found that communities with a higher proportion of black residents, lower voter turnouts, and lower housing values were more likely to experience increases in exposure to TRI pollutants from 1990 to 1992. Although Shapiro (1999) did not find comparable racial effects, he reports that wealthy communities have achieved greater reduction of TRI pollutants than their poorer neighbours. In contrast, Hamilton (1999) found no effect on TRI reductions from 1988 to 1991 of property values, levels of educational attainment, or fraction of black residents in the surrounding community, but he did find a significant impact of voter turnout, suggesting that the effect of community wealth found in other studies may be a surrogate for political mobilization. Collectively, these studies suggest that the impact of information dissemination about toxic substances may well be a net transfer of risk from wealthy, well-educated, politically-empowered communities to their poorer, less educated, less politically-engaged neighbours. We seek to confirm this effect in the analysis that follows by examining the impact of mean community income on changes in NPRI releases over time.
We also consider the potential for two perverse effects of interest group pressures. To the extent that local interest groups exert influence, facilities may respond simply by shipping wastes off-site to other communities for disposal. Consistent with this, Khanna et al. (1998) report that although the uncontrolled discharges reported to TRI by the worst polluters did decline over time, the sum of their releases and transfers for off-site disposal did not. We thus consider the relationship between off-site transfers and on-site releases, and in particular the extent to which they are substitutes, in the regressions that follow.
Finally, as Tietenberg (1998) has speculated, if the public focuses naïvely on total discharges (as reports on TRI by environmental groups have tended to do), rather than distinguishing between more and less toxic substances, firms could respond by reducing discharges of substances with the lowest marginal control or substitution costs, which may not be the most toxic. To investigate this possible effect, we compare trends in releases adjusted and unadjusted for toxicity.
Regulation and Regulatory Threats
Of course a final reason that facilities may choose to reduce their toxic releases is that they are required by law to do so. Given the central role of the state in regulating pollution, it is somewhat surprising that many who have applauded the reductions of releases reported to TRI and NPRI have simply assumed that they were made voluntarily (see, for instance, Tietenberg (1998, p. 593) , Fung and O'Rourke (2000) , and Maxwell et al. (2000, p. 585, p. 603) ). Yet a closer look at recent work suggests a need for greater attention to the role of regulation and liability in accounting for observed emission trends. O'Toole et al. (1997) found that stringency of state regulations, as ranked by national environmental groups, was one of the two most important factors in accounting for state-level reductions of 33/50 chemicals. Shapiro (1998 Shapiro ( , 1999 ) also found significant effects of state regulatory stringency on individual facilities' discharges. Khanna and Damon (1999) found that potential liability under the federal Superfund law and anticipation of new national hazardous air pollutant regulations under the US Clean Air Act were among the most significant factors in explaining firms' releases of 33/50 program chemicals. Finally, Santos, Covello, and McCallum (1996) found that regulatory compliance was one of the two reasons most frequently cited by facilities (the other being employee health) for reduction of their TRI releases and transfers. We attempt to investigate the impact of regulation on reported releases in two ways. First, we consider the impact of excluding facilities facing new national regulations on aggregate trends in releases.
Second, we compare facilities regulated under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act with those not regulated under the Act.
The emergence in the last decade of negotiated voluntary environmental agreements between polluters and the state, most prominently in Europe, has focused attention on the role of the threat of regulation as a motive for pollution abatement. 4 Advocates of this approach have argued that the mere threat of regulation can prompt comparable levels of control as would be achieved by regulation, but at reduced cost to both the state and polluting firms (European Environmental
Agency (1997)). However, others have argued that when industry consents to voluntary measures, the price of that consent is relaxed expectations for environmental performance (Rennings et al. (1997) ). The fact that the Canadian Environmental Protection Act establishes a step-wise approach to regulation, by which pollutants are identified as candidates for regulation and an attempt is then made to negotiate voluntary sectoral agreements before turning to regulation, has allowed us to compare the responses of facilities that face actual regulations with those that face an explicit threat of regulation.
Finally, just as pressures from non-governmental stakeholders may be influenced by the availability of discharge inventories, so too may regulators respond to new information. Facilities' reports may alert regulators to risks they had not previously been aware of, and thus prompt new regulations, stricter permit conditions, or more aggressive enforcement activity. Decker (2001) has demonstrated that facilities with larger TRI reports receive more frequent compliance inspections, though he is unable to rule out the possibility that those facilities were subject to greater regulatory scrutiny before the release of the TRI data. In the absence of a database of regulatory oversight and enforcement activities in Canada, we cannot directly confirm these effects. However, as with community pressures, one would expect regulators to pay greater attention to both larger facilities and facilities located in more densely populated communities, since they present greater potential for harm. (Indeed, as noted above, regulatory scrutiny may be prompted by community pressure.)
In addition, regulators who have access to more information on facility processes and production capacities unavailable to the public are in a unique position to identify and pressure facilities that are more pollution intensive than their counterparts. As an indirect measure of regulatory pressure, we thus investigate whether pollution intensive facilities have made greater efforts to reduce their NPRI releases over time.
Significance of National Context
The foregoing discussion considers different kinds of pressure for pollution abatement that facilities may face in any country. It is striking that evidence of the influence of local community pressures has been found in both industrialized and developing countries (Pargal et al. (1997) ).
However, the degree of influence exercised by different actors can be expected to vary depending on the economic and political context. In that regard, it is noteworthy that virtually all of the literature cited above is based on US data.
One might expect several features of the Canadian context to be relevant. Geographic variation in racial composition of the population is less significant in Canada than the US. It is thus not surprising that Baggs (1998) finds no relationship between race and pollution incidence in Canada.
She also notes that, in contrast to the US, the most polluted communities in Canada tend to be in rural areas, reflecting the economic significance of primary resource industries such as mining, smelting, and pulp and paper (though this could also be a function of inclusion of a broader range of industries in the Canadian inventory). This preponderance of rural facilities also suggests that in Canada there may be more single-industry towns, the residents of which may be more reticent to act on discharge inventories than their neighbours in more heterogeneous urban communities.
Finally, Canada and the United States historically have taken quite different approaches to toxic substances regulation (Harrison and Hoberg (1994) ), with Canadian regulators being more inclined to negotiate agreements with polluters and less inclined to pursue adversarial enforcement. Threats of regulation thus may carry less weight in Canada than the US. This is consistent with Laplante and Lanoie (1994)'s finding that, while US investors react negatively to announcements of lawsuits against a firm, Canadian investors do not respond until there is an announcement of actual fines. It is also noteworthy that, based on a comparison of TRI and NPRI data, Olewiler and Dawson (1998) found that Canadian manufacturing industries had roughly 50% higher discharges relative to sales than their American counterparts, suggesting that regulation may be less stringent in Canada. On the other hand, if Canadian governments with weaker environmental standards do turn their attention to environmental regulation, they may be able to make rapid progress by harvesting "low-hanging fruit."
Data and Methodology

The National Pollutant Release Inventory
In this study, we analyse the first seven years of data in the Canadian National Pollutant Inventory, corresponding to the period 1993-1999 and covering almost 2,500 facilities. Like the US TRI, the NPRI has several limitations. First, it is noteworthy that facilities prepare their own reports with minimal oversight by regulators. Indeed, facilities are not required to measure their own discharges; they can estimate them using techniques of varying reliability. Moreover, facilities may change their estimation methods over time. Natan and Miller (1998) found that more than half of reductions of production-related waste reported to TRI were "paper reductions," such as recategorizing waste streams so that they no longer had to be reported. The fact that until 1998 reporting of waste reduction, reuse, and recycling to NPRI was voluntary may have created opportunities for a uniquely Canadian version of this shell game.
Second, not all pollutants of interest are included in NPRI. The substances covered by NPRI excludes pesticides and ozone-depleting substances scheduled to be phased out. As with TRI, because the focus of NPRI is "toxic" substances released in significant quantities, the inventory has excluded both high volume, low toxicity "conventional pollutants," such as BOD and particulates, as well as highly toxic substances, such as dioxins, that are released in small quantities (though the latter were added to the inventory in 2000).
Third, not all sources of potential interest are covered by the inventory. Although NPRI includes more than just the manufacturing sectors found in TRI, it still excludes some potentially significant sectors, including primary industries such as forestry, agriculture, and oil production.
Like TRI, facilities below a certain size (i.e., those with fewer than 10 employees that do not produce or use NPRI substances in quantities greater than 10 tonnes) are not required to report. Facilities covered by NPRI are required to report on-site releases to various media (air, water, land application, underground injection), as well as off-site transfers for disposal or storage. It is noteworthy that the category of on-site releases includes both direct releases to air and water as well as waste disposal methods that entail some further degree of risk reduction, such as releases to land application and underground injection. Thus, the distinction between on-site releases and off-site transfers is not entirely coincident with a distinction between direct releases and waste treatment.
We have made various adjustments to the raw data to account for minor changes to the definition of various NPRI substances over time. 7 We have also excluded 73 substances that were added to the NPRI list in 1999 to ensure comparability over time.
Data Preview
It is illuminating to consider trends in the aggregate data reported to NPRI. Table 1 summarizes trends in on-site releases and off-site transfers, while Table 2 presents the same trends adjusted for toxicity. The totals in group A of Table 1 are based on reports from all facilities that reported to NPRI. 8 These data suggest five conclusions. First and most obvious, there has been an encouraging 27% decrease in the total weight of on-site releases between 1993 and 1999, though it is noteworthy that a larger decrease of 38% had been achieved by 1996, which has been offset since by growth in releases.
There are reasons to believe that these reductions may be understated. Group A includes reports from a growing number of facilities reporting to the inventory over time. While some of these are new facilities contributing real increases in waste production, others are presumably older facilities that only belatedly learned of the requirement to report to NPRI. Reductions made over time may thus be understated since discharges by the latter facilities are not included in earlier years. Second, a change in reporting requirements in 1995, which mandated participation in 1995 and later years by facilities producing dilute waste streams that previously had not been required to report, may also have had the effect of understating reductions. The NPRI program estimates that this change resulted in an increase of at least 8,000 tonnes between the 1994 and 1995 annual reports. However, since facilities that cross the threshold have always been required to report all their releases of NPRI substances, however dilute, this change should not have had any effect on reports by facilities already in the database. We have attempted to correct for these factors by focusing on the subset of facilities that reported in both 1993 and 1999, which we refer to as the "continuous reporters." As anticipated, these facilities (group B in Table 1 ) are doing somewhat better than the totals for all facilities. The fact that decreases in on-site and total releases are larger for group B than in the unadjusted totals reflects the growing contribution of new reporters over time.
Our second observation concerns cross-media transfers. While the overall picture with respect to on-site releases is encouraging, very different trends are evident in releases to different media.
In fact, the decrease in total on-site releases is almost entirely attributable to an 81% reduction of releases to surface water, which compensated for concurrent increases in discharges to air (20%), land (10%) and underground injection (80%). Increases in on-site releases to air and underground injection are also apparent among the continuous reporters.
A third observation concerns the trends in off-site transfers. The NPRI program believes that off-site transfers were overstated in 1993 as a result of confusion during that first reporting year about the distinction between off-site waste transfers and recycling (Environment Canada (1994) ).
This is consistent with the drop in off-site transfers from 1993 to 1994. Since then, there has been a high degree of variability in total off-site transfers (Group A, Table 1 ), but transfers in later years are generally higher than those in early years. 9 This apparent increase in off-site transfers suggests that facilities are increasingly utilizing storage and external treatment of their toxic wastes.
That is encouraging inasmuch as the alternative is release of untreated wastes via the stack or sewer. However, it also reveals persistent reliance on end-of-pipe solutions, rather than pollution prevention through reduction at the source.
The increase in off-site transfers also implies that reductions in on-site releases are, to a large degree, being achieved by shifting wastes to other communities. It is noteworthy that the other streams that have witnessed the largest increases, on-site land application and underground injection, are those that are least visible to the neighboring community. This suggests that facilities may be motivated, whether by regulation or public pressure we cannot say, to shift their wastes to less controversial venues for disposal. The growth in reliance on underground injection is consistent with trends in the United States (Ruhl (1999) ).
Our fourth observation concerns the apparent contribution of traditional regulation to these aggregate trends. It is noteworthy that just 10 facilities account for 73% of the reduction in on-site releases by continuous reporters. Indeed, a single Quebec facility, Kronos Canada, which produces paint pigments, accounts for about half the total reductions. Those dramatic reductions were the result of regulatory enforcement actions by both the federal and provincial governments in the early 1990s. 10 Besides Kronos, many of the facilities that contributed the greatest reductions were pulp and paper mills (Canadian SIC 27). The pulp and paper industry is the only industry that faced new discharge regulations at the national level during this period, and it was also subject to extensive regulatory reform at the provincial level in the early 1990s (Harrison (1996) ). Moreover, in adopting its new regulations for the industry, the federal government announced that it would pursue strict enforcement through the courts in lieu of the negotiated compliance approach that had failed in the past (Harrison (1995) ).
Since there is compelling evidence that these reductions were driven by regulation, rather than non-governmental pressures, the final series of totals in Tables 1 (Group C) report trends among the continuous reporters with Kronos and the pulp and paper industry excluded. The striking contrast between trends in on-site releases for all facilities, continuous reporting facilities, and continuous reporting facilities excluding these newly regulated sources is presented in Figure 3 . Once the most obvious impacts of national regulation are excluded, the 27% reduction of on-site releases by continuous reporters evaporates, leaving a net increase of 7%. This suggests that the dramatic reductions of toxic discharges reported to NPRI, especially between 1993 and 1996 when both the Kronos enforcement action and the new pulp and paper regulations took effect, is largely the result of traditional command-and-control regulations adopted prior to and quite independent of the creation of NPRI, rather than a voluntary response to non-governmental pressures facilitated by information disclosure. Although non-governmental pressures may well have had an impact in preventing further increases in releases, most of the documented reductions to date can be accounted for by traditional regulation.
Comparison of Tables 1 and 2 yields a fifth insight. The relative contribution of different waste streams to total releases looks very different when one takes into account the toxicity of different NPRI substances. In particular, on-site releases to land and off-site transfers account for a much higher proportion of total releases because the substances in these waste streams are, on average, more toxic. In addition, there have been shifts over time in the composition of various waste streams. For instance, although Table 1 indicates that there was a 27% decrease in the weight of onsite releases from 1993 to 1999 (Group A), this translates to only an 11% reduction after adjusting for toxicity; while the total weight of releases has declined, the average toxicity of those releases has increased. Similarly, the 9% decrease in the weight of off-site transfers reported in Table 1 corresponds to a 127% increase after adjusting for chronic toxicity. This suggests that the benefits of decreasing the quantity of waste transferred off-site may actually have been outweighed by the increasing toxicity of this waste stream. This trend in off-site transfers is particularly noteworthy since, if anything, over-reporting of off-site transfers in 1993 would have tended to understate any increase. Finally, the disparity in trends of releases to different media noted above is even more pronounced after toxicity adjustment. In fact, the streams that are growing the most by weight-off-site transfers, on-site land disposal, and underground injection-are simultaneously becoming more toxic. In light of our speculation above that shifts from less-toxic to more-toxic substances could be prompted by either regulation or non-governmental pressures, it is noteworthy that the facilities known to have made large reductions in their releases in response to regulation, Kronos and the pulp and paper industry, reported reductions in both unadjusted and toxicity-adjusted releases.
Moreover, their off-site releases decreased in both volume and toxicity.
In interpreting these trends, it is important to reiterate the caveats noted above. Reliance on CHHI scores offers only a preliminary assessment of the relative toxicity of different NPRI substances and waste streams. Neither does it account for dispersion and exposure, nor does it distinguish between direct releases to the environment and releases destined for treatment or storage, which presumably mitigate risks. However, the disparity between trends based on weight and those taking into account toxicity nonetheless suggest troubling shifts in the composition of NPRI waste streams.
Definition of Variables
Regression analysis of NPRI panel data allows us to look more closely at the impacts of facility location, community demographics, and regulatory threats on individual facilities' toxic releases. Our analysis seeks to explain both on-site releases in a given year and trends in on-site releases over time. As noted in Antweiler and Harrison (2000) , the distribution of on-site releases reported to NPRI is approximately log-normal. We thus define our first dependent variable x f t ≡ log 10 (X f t ) as the log of on-site releases X f t = P p=1 R r=1 E f prt , where facilities are denoted by index f = 1, .., F ; index t denotes time; pollutants are indexed by p = 1, .., P ; release methods are indexed r = 1, .., R; and on-site releases are denoted by E f prt . In some regressions, we have employed toxicity-adjustment factors W pr , and thus define our second dependent variablẽ x f t ≡ log 10 (X f t ) as the log of toxicity-adjusted on-site emissionsX f t ≡ P p=1 R r=1 E f prt W pr . In examining factors influencing the change in on-site releases, we introduce two other dependent variables, corresponding to the difference in the log of on-site releases with and without toxicity adjustment: ∆x f t ≡x f t −x f,t−1 and ∆x f t ≡ x f t − x f,t−1 .
We include all facilities in all years with a few exceptions. We have excluded two significant outliers, Kronos (discussed above) and the Giant Gold Mine in the Northwest Territories, which introduced a substantial share of the increase in toxicity-adjusted underground injection by substantially increasing its releases of arsenic. We have also excluded the 1999 reports of two facilities that NPRI officials believe to be in error.
11 Finally, in addition to Kronos, we exclude the other case of identifiable regulatory intervention, the pulp and paper industry (Canadian SIC 27).
We introduce a number of independent variables. To control for technological or other sectoral differences, we have employed random effects regressions based on 3-digit Canadian SIC groups.
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In the absence of production or sales data, we employ the log of the number of employees at a facility as a crude measure of scale of production, with the straightforward expectation that onsite releases will be positively correlated with the scale of operations. 13 This variable takes on a somewhat different meaning, however, when we examine the change in releases over time. There, we include the change in the log of employees to account for changes in production levels over time (again anticipating a positive coefficient), while a negative coefficient of the log of employees itself is anticipated to the extent that larger facilities make greater pollution reductions over time in response to interest group and/or regulatory pressures.
In order to examine the impact of community characteristics on facilities' pollutant releases, we merged the NPRI data with 1991 Canadian national census data. We employ the log of population density, calculated from the total number of people living in census enumeration districts in a 50 km 2 area centered around each facility. 14 We expect to find a negative coefficient if local communities and/or regulators exert greater pressure on facilities when more people are placed at risk from their releases. Average community income is calculated as the population-weighted average within the same area, and we also use a log transformation. 15 With respect to the change in releases over time, we employ a linear model with the expectation, based on US studies, of a negative coefficient reflecting better use of NPRI data by wealthy communities.
We have also included measures of off-site transfers to test for substitution between on-site releases and off-site transfers. We employ the percentage-share of a facility's total (on-and offsite) releases that is shipped off-site for disposal.
16 If on-site releases are reduced by shifting wastes off-site, the coefficient will be negative.
Finally, we define pollution intensity in a given year as the log of on-site releases per employee.
We lag this variable by one year to avoid simultaneity. In analysing the change in releases over time, we anticipate a negative coefficent if regulators are attentive to the environmental performance of facilities relative to their peers of comparable size and scale.
In light of the apparent impact of national regulations on aggregate trends in NPRI releases, we have employed several measures to explore the impact of regulation on toxic releases. The regulatory process established at the federal level by the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA)
provides an opportunity to investigate the impact of both existing and threatened regulations.
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CEPA establishes a step-by-step process by which toxic substances are identified, evaluated, and controlled. The first step is generation of a "Priority Substances List." Substances on that list are then evaluated to determine whether they are toxic as defined by CEPA. Those deemed to be "CEPA-toxic" are moved to the "List of Toxic Substances," by which action various regulatory measures are authorized. In practice, Environment Canada attempts to negotiate voluntary control strategies with the sectors associated with releases of each of these substances. If those negotiations fail, substances from the List of Toxic Substances are formally regulated, thus joining regulated substances on "Schedule 1," which were grandfathered from other statutes when CEPA became law in 1988. In order to compare the impact of actual and threatened regulation, we define two variables: "CEPA-toxic" referring to substances on the first priority substance list that were deemed toxic (a decision that was made by the end of 1993); and "Schedule 1" referring to substances that have actually been regulated under CEPA. In each case, the variable is defined as the fraction of a facility's total waste production (including off-site transfers) that falls within that regulatory category. Table 3 summarizes the means and standard deviations as well as minima and maxima of all variables used in our regressions. Table 4 presents our benchmark regressions for our four dependent variables. Columns 1 and 3 present regressions of the log of annual on-site releases, with column 1 representing toxicityadjusted releases and column 3 representing unadjusted releases. These annual releases provide a snapshot of facilities' performance in a given year. Columns 2 and 4 present growth-rate regressions for unadjusted and toxicity-adjusted measures respectively of the change in the log of on-site releases over time. These regressions thus focus on whether facilities are increasing or decreasing their releases over time.
Statistical Analyses
The most significant impact on annual releases, both unadjusted and adjusted for toxicity (columns 1 and 3), is the size of the facility as measured by the number of employees. Not surprisingly, larger facilities simply produce more waste. However, the fact that the coefficient is less than one in both columns 1 and 3 is consistent with both economies of scale in pollution control and greater scrutiny of larger facilities by regulators or the public. The coefficient of the share of wastes sent off-site is also negative and highly significant in both the adjusted and unadjusted regressions. This is indicative of a substitution effect: all else being equal, facilities with 2% lower toxicity-adjusted on-site releases have 1%-point higher share of offsite transfers. We also find that on-site releases are affected by population density: facilities in more densely populated communities tend to have significantly lower on-site releases. This may reflect greater regulatory or stakeholder pressure on facilities in urban areas, or simply the fact that in Canada many of the facilities with the largest toxic releases, including mines, smelters, and pulp mills, are located in remote areas in proximity to the primary resources they exploit. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that average income of the surrounding community (i.e., 50 km 2 area) has no significant effect on either releases in a given year or change in releases over time. Income effects may still be present at a finer level of spatial aggregation, a question we will explore in future work.
The regressions in columns 2 and 4 examine the speed with which facilities reduce (or increase) their on-site releases. In these regressions we introduce two new variables, pollution intensity and the change in the log of employees, which we use as a surrogate for changes in production levels.
As anticipated, the coefficient of the latter is positive and significant, confirming that increases in the scale of operations are associated with increases in pollutant releases. However, since the total number of employees in our sample has been quite steady, changes in the scale of operation have not contributed much to changes in total releases over time. Facility size is also a significant determinant of changes in on-site releases, which is consistent with both regulatory or non-governmental pressures on larger facilities. Consistent with scrutiny by regulators, who have access to information unavailable to the public concerning facility type and production levels, pollution intensity is the single most important predictor of changes in on-site releases. In contrast, neither population density nor average income of the local community, both of which could be indicative of non-governmental pressures, is significant. Consistent with the off-site substitution effect noted above, we find that increases in the (unadjusted) weight of on-site releases are associated with higher transfers of wastes off-site. This effect is not significant in the toxicity-adjusted case, however.
Our estimates also indicate a negative time trend both in the level and growth rate of emissions. After accounting for the variables in our model, facilities are reducing emissions over time, and at an accelerating rate. However, this is not necessarily the result of governmental or nongovernmental pressures. Facilities may be experiencing technological progress in pollution abatement, which is often linked to a vintage effect when old and pollution-intense production technology is replaced by newer, more efficient, and less pollution-intense production technology.
18 Table 5 explores the impact on on-site releases of actual and threatened federal regulation. Here we have repeated the benchmark regression from column 2 of Table 4 (growth rates of toxicityadjusted releases) for different subsets of facilities depending on their regulatory status. We define a facility as subject to CEPA regulation if "Schedule 1" substances constitute at least 10% of its total on-site and off-site releases.
19 Similarly, we deem a threat of federal regulation to exist if "CEPA-toxic" substances constitute greater than 10% of a facility's total releases. Column 1 of Table 5 focuses only on facilities subject to CEPA regulation, while column 2 considers all remaining facilities. Column 3 then focuses on the subset of "unregulated" facilities that are subject to the threat of regulation of CEPA-toxic substances, while column 4 considers the remaining "unregulated and unthreatened" facilities.
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As in the benchmark regression (column 2 of Table 4), the most statistically significant findings in Table 5 are those concerning size of facility, population density, pollution intensity, and off-site transfers. The overall pattern is unchanged, but there are important differences in the magnitudes of the estimates. In particular, the differences between the coefficients in columns 1 and 2 suggest that larger and more pollution-intensive facilities are reducing their releases significantly more quickly if they face federal regulatory mandates than if they do not. However, the more strongly negative coefficient of the off-site transfer share in the regulated group suggests that-to at least some degree-those on-site reductions are achieved by shipping wastes off-site. There are two surprising results in column 1, however. First, regulated facilities that are expanding in scale, as indicated by an increasing number of employees, report more than proportional increases in on-site releases, though this is a minor effect because overall employment levels changed very little over time in our sample. Second, the significant positive income effect in column 1 suggests that, contrary to our expectations, regulated facilities in high-income communities are reducing their pollution less quickly than those in lower income communities. However, this may be less indicative of environmental pressures from the local community than of economic growth, since increases in production are associated not only with increasing pollution but also with job creation.
Comparing the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 , we find that the threat of regulation of "CEPA-toxic" substances has less impact than actual regulation of "Schedule 1" substances. The coefficients of pollution intensity are significantly different between columns 3 and 4, indicating that more pollution-intensive facilities subject to regulatory threat have reduced their releases by more than those that do not face such a threat. However, the effect is half as strong as in the case of actual regulation. 21 In sum, the results from Table 5 suggest that facilities facing federal regulations are doing more to reduce their on-site releases than their "unregulated" counterparts, particularly if they are large and/or pollution intensive. In contrast, the mere threat of regulation has relatively little impact.
Conclusions
From 1993, when the Canadian National Pollutant Release Inventory was first released, to 1999, the latest year for which data are available, facilities reporting to the inventory reduced their releases of toxic substances by an impressive and encouraging 27%. In this article, we attempt to account for that reduction by considering different incentives polluters have to reduce their releases:
government regulation, threats of regulation, and non-governmental pressures from consumers, workers, investors, and local communities, the latter presumably enhanced by the public release of NPRI data.
Our analysis indicates that the quite dramatic reduction in on-site releases observed during the first few years of Canada's NPRI is less a product of better-informed communities, consumers, workers, and shareholders taking matters into their own hands than of governments pursuing quite traditional command-and-control regulation. In the Canadian case, whatever impacts disclosure of information about toxic releases may be having "through honor and shame" (Afsah and Ratundanda (1999) ), they have apparently been overwhelmed by old-fashioned threats and punishment.
Indeed, one of the most valuable, though little-acknowledged, functions of NPRI thus far has been in tracking the success of, rather than prompting non-governmental pressures as a substitute for, regulation. Although the effects of regulation under the federal Fisheries Act are most pronounced, with enforcement action against a single chemical plant and more stringent regulation of the pulp and paper industry overwhelming all other effects during the period in question, absent those facilities we still find strong effects of regulation under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act.
While non-governmental pressures may still have had an impact, for instance in prompting facilities to forgo pollution increases they would otherwise have made, it remains the case that a significant majority of the reductions reported to date relative to the 1993 baseline can be accounted for by regulation. Of particular interest in light of the growing attention to voluntary programs as an alternative to regulation, we find that Canadian facilities have responded less aggressively to the mere threat of regulation than to actual regulation.
The fact that bigger and more pollution-intensive facilities reporting to NPRI are the ones making the greatest effort to reduce their on-site releases provides considerable room for optimism. This was among the most significant findings of our statistical analysis of NPRI panel data. Although these effects were strongest among facilities facing federal regulation, it was highly significant for other facilities as well. Greater attention to larger facilities is consistent with both regulatory and non-governmental pressures. However, we interpret the greater effort by pollution-intensive facilities or comparable size to be more indicative of a regulatory effect, since non-governmental actors do not have access to information on facility type and production with which to assess facilities' relative pollution intensiveness.
Despite these encouraging findings, our analysis provides cause for concern in several respects.
First, the reductions in on-site releases to date have been almost entirely a result of legally compelled reductions in releases to surface water. Indeed, the overwhelming impact of these reductions on the overall trend in on-site releases masks significant increases in other waste streams, including releases to air, underground injection, and landfills. Off-site transfers have also increased as on-site releases have declined. This suggests that reductions in on-site releases are being achieved largely through traditional end-of-pipe solutions, rather than source reduction, though we cannot say to what degree this is a response to NIMBY-type community pressures vs. regulation. Moreover, in light of the disproportionate reliance on storage options of underground injection and landfill-ing in managing wastes off-site, one might ask to what degree we are engaged in a shell game, with the apparent progress in reducing releases to date merely reflecting transfer of risks to other communities and future generations.
The disparate trends in releases to different media and transfers of wastes to other communities are even more worrisome when one considers the toxicity of different NPRI substances. Although the total weight of on-site releases has declined substantially, the toxicity of those releases has increased. This suggests that facilities may be changing the composition of their releases in response to market-driven shifts in production or, alternatively, substituting low volume, high toxicity substances for high volume, low toxicity substances in response to pressures from non-governmental stakeholders or regulatory threats. In either case, the trend has yet to be acknowledged and addressed by Canadian regulators.
In contrast to recent US studies, we generally do not find significant impacts of community income on either the current releases or changes in releases over time. One might expect more pronounced community effects in the US, since the preponderance of rural facilities in Canada tends to yield single-industry towns, residents of which may be more reticent to pressure facilities for pollution reductions than their neighbours in more heterogeneous urban communities. The greater pollution intensity of Canadian manufacturing industries relative to their US counterparts (Olewiler and Dawson, 1998 ) may also suggest the potential for stronger regulatory effects: there simply they may be more "low hanging fruit" available for Canadian regulators to harvest. The implications of this for interpretation of trends in toxic releases are less than clear-cut, however. On one hand, the greater ease with which Canadian regulators may be able to deliver significant reductions might lead one to expect a greater impact of regulation on the Canadian pollutant inventory. On the other hand, the seemingly greater historical aggressiveness of US regulators suggests a need to carefully consider the degree to which the decline in US TRI reports may also be a response to regulation rather than stakeholder pressures.
Our analysis suggests that complacency with respect to the impact of dissemination of pollutant information as a policy tool is premature. In the end, the Canadian National Pollutant Release
Inventory data most clearly reveal both the promise of regulation and the significant challenges that remain.
Notes
1 M. Mansur, and G.S. Reeves, "Lower numbers hide growing toxic dangers," Kansas City Star, October 9 1996, A1, cited in Fung and O'Rourke (2000, p. 116) .
2 A similar approach is taken by Maxwell et al. (2000, p. 604) .
3 Environmental Defense's (US) Scorecard can be found at www.scorecard.org. The counterpart site developed more recently by a coalition of Canadian groups and Environmental Defense is at www.scorecard.org/pollutionwatch.
4 The literature on voluntary approaches is summarized in Harrison (2001) . 5 Hamilton (1999) has gone further in incorporating estimates of toxicity and disperson for airborne carcinogens reported to TRI. However, there is no comparable model in Canada to the one he uses. Moreover, Hamilton's approach entails limiting analysis to a subset of pollutants, facilities, and releases (i.e., those to air).
6 For details about the CHHI see the EPA's web site at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/env ind/chgtox.htm. An important advantage of the CHHI data is that EPA has developed separate toxicity scores depending on whether exposure occurs via oral intake or inhalation. We have employed inhalation scores for releases to air, and oral toxicity scores for all other releases. This assumes that the ultimate source of human exposure from land-based disposal techniques, including landfills, land-farming, and underground injection will be via surface or ground water contamination. Coverage of toxins by CHHI measures is incomplete, but we can account for over 90% of the raw weight of pollutants. One potential bias is with respect to nitrate, for which the CHHI does not provide both oral and inhalation scores. Following Hettige et al. (1992) and Horvath et al. (1995) , we have also used threshold limit values set by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists to confirm the robustness of our results. However, the TLV approach has several limitations that are at least partly overcome by reliance on CHHI measures. TLVs are designed to reflect the toxicity of airborne substances only, and the same toxicity rankings may not apply to other forms of exposure. Another drawback is that TLVs are developed for occupational settings, where exposures to toxic substances tend to be high relative to ambient environmental exposures. The same toxicity rankings may not hold at lower exposure levels. Due to space limitation, we do not report the detailed results using TLVs, but make them available upon request.
7 Iso-butyl alcohol (CAS 78-83-1) was added only in 1994, so we have excluded it in all cases. In addition, chlormethyl methyl ether (CAS 107-30-2) was deleted from the inventory in 1994. However, since it had not been reported in 1993 anyway, this has no impact on the study. In 1995, ammonium nitrate and ammonium sulphate were deleted, and "ammonia" was changed to "total ammonia," to include the ammonia portion of the deleted substances and "nitrate ion" was added to account for the nitrate portion of ammonium nitrate. The total weight reported post-1995 should thus be equivalent to the previous total less the weight of sulphate in pre-1995 reports of ammonium sulphate. We have thus corrected the pre-1995 totals by subtracting the weight of sulphate from ammonium sulphate reports, a technique also used by the NPRI program in making year-to-year comparisons. Acetone was deleted from the inventory in 1999, so we have also deleted it from previous years to ensure comparability. We made no adjustment for other minor changes that did not appear to have had a significant affect on the data. Thus, no correction was made to account for the addition of the phrase "friable form" to asbestos in 1995 and later years. Also in 1995, the phrase "and its salts" was added to various acids and bases, and guidance on the meaning of this phrase was added in 1996. However, only 3 of the acids and bases in NPRI have salts that are produced or used in Canada (two salts each for CAS numbers 139-13-9; 108-95-2; and 62-53-3). We did not make any adjustment for these, as there did not appear to be any significant changes in reports from facilities reporting these substances. In 1995, NPRI merged the categories "zinc (fume or dust)" and zinc in a new category "zinc and its compounds," which we have assumed to be the sum of the previous two. The reporting threshold for nitrate in solution was decreased from pH>6.5 in 1995 to pH>6.0 in 1996, which we have assumed to have a negligible effect (particularly since any increase in reporting on nitrate could be counterbalanced by decreased reporting of nitric acid.) Finally, we have taken into account estimates provided by facilities reporting discharges of less than 1 tonne of the range of their estimates (e.g., 0.0 to 0.2 tonnes, 0.2 to 0.4 tonnes, etc.) by assuming that discharges are at the midpoint of the relevant range. The NPRI program appears to have assumed these discharges to be zero, which may account for minor differences between our totals and those reported by NPRI.
8 One exception is the Philip Mill Services facility in Hamilton, which has alerted NPRI staff to a reporting error in 1999. In the 1999 data, we have thus excluded that facility, as well as Safety-Kleen in Corunna ON, to which Philip Mill Services transferred its waste.
9 It is unlikely that the observed increase is attributable either to the threshold change in 1995, since reported off-site transfers actually decreased that year, or to delayed compliance, since the largest increases in off-site transfers have been reported in more recent years when one would anticipate higher levels of reporting compliance.
10 When the company failed to install treatment facilities by the end of 1991, as it had committed to do in a compli-ance schedule previously negotiated with the province, the federal government fined the facility and pressed additional charges against both the company and two of its executives. Simultaneously, the provincial government indicated that it would shut down the plant if it did not commit to a new compliance schedule. When the provincial government did shut down another facility in a similar situation, and with federal charges also pending, Kronos finally invested in the process changes that dramatically reduced its toxic discharges. We have also examined fixed effects regressions, but found no significant differences between the two approaches; see Antweiler and Harrison (2000) . 13 The NPRI provides employment data for each facility since 1994, but no output data. For the 1993 pollution data we employ 1994 employment data where available.
14 This is an area within a 4 km radius of the facility. 15 We have also tried a combination of a linear and quadratic terms to capture a possible Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) effect. We were not able to establish an EKC robustly at the level of spatial aggregation we have considered. 16 We calculate the transfer share as the percentage of off-site transfers relative to the sum of on-site emissions and off-site transfers. This ratio should be thought of as an exogenous choice parameter for the firm. We cannot use the level of off-site transfers directly because it is simultaneously determined with the level of on-site releases.
17 It is noteworthy, however, that improvements made by Kronos and the pulp and paper industry were prompted by enforcement of the federal Fisheries Act.
18 The acceleration during 1993-99 may have something to do with the upswing in the business cycle during which capital replacement proceeds at a faster rate. The 7-year time period is too short to rule out such a business cycle effect.
19 The 10% threshold may appear arbitrary. However, the distribution of the percentage shares is strongly concentrated around the 0% and 100% levels, with relatively few facilities in the intermediate range. Therefore the choice of threshold influences the results only marginally.
20 Consequently, the number of observations in columns 3 and 4 add up to the number of observations in column 2, and the number of observations in columns 1 and 2 add up to the number of observations in column 2 of Table 4 .
21 Compare (-0.771)-(-0.549)=(0.222) in columns 1 and 2 with (-0.649)-(-0.565)=(0.084) in columns 3 and 4; the latter difference is less than half of the former difference. Note: The dependent variable x f it ≡ log 10 (X f it ) is the decadic logarithm of the amount of on-site releases, while ∆x f it ≡ x f it − x f i,t−1 is the log change in on-site releases. Index f it indicates facility f in industry i in year t. In columns (1) and (2), on-site releases were adjusted for toxicity using EPA-CHHI measures, while in columns (3) and (4) unadjusted figures were used. Toxicity adjustments are indicated by a tilde on top of the variable. The estimation method uses random effects in all cases, based on 3-digit Canadian-SIC industry groups. Observations where on-site releases are zero were excluded from this set of regressions. T-statistics (without sign) are given in parentheses. Significance at the 95% and 99%, and 99.9% levels are indicated with the superscripts a, b and c. Note: See footnote to table 4 for explanations about the regression parameters. The sample was split into groups depending on if 10% or more of emissions are subject to regulatory intervention due to CEPA Schedule 1, or if they are subject to regulatory threat due to listing as CEPA-Toxic. Column 2 from Table 4 is broken up into columns 1 and 2 in this table; columns 3 and 4 break column 2 into further subgroups.
